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MORALES-SANTANA AND THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY IN
COMPARATIVE LAW 
Jerfi Uzman* 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Sessions v. Morales-Santana has 
refueled a classic debate about constitutional remedies in equal protection 
cases.1 How should courts respond to underinclusive legislation? Non-
discrimination clauses are seldom clear about how equality is to be 
accomplished. The most obvious remedy, one that is generally preferred 
by plaintiffs, is that the benefits reserved for the advantaged group are 
extended to those who were disadvantaged. However, equal protection 
law would equally be satisfied if both groups are denied the benefit. 
Levelling down may be considered “the mean remedy,” but it is usually 
considered a remedy. After all, the plaintiff would get equal treatment.2 
* Dr. J. (Jerfi) Uzman is an Assistant Professor at Leiden University Law School in the Netherlands. 
I am grateful to Professor Tracy Thomas for the invitation to present this paper at the 2017 virtual 
conference on The Constitution and Remedies, and to the participants for their invaluable input. More 
advice is always appreciated: j.uzman@law.leidenuniv.nl. 
1. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Remedy in Morales-Santana (Again), BALKINIZATION BLOG
(June 13, 2017) https://balkin.blogspot.nl/2017/06/the-remedy-in-morales-santana-again.html 
[https://perma.cc/4NP7-9JL9]; Mike Dorf, Equal Protection and Leveling Down as Schadenfreude, 
DORF ON LAW BLOG (June 14, 2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/equal-protection-and-
leveling-down-as.html?m=1 [https://perma.cc/MM9K-ALL2]; Tracy Thomas, SCOTUS Denial of 
Equal Protection sRemedy Jeopardizes Equality Law: What was Justice Ginsburg Thinking?, 
GENDER AND THE LAW PROF BLOG (June 13, 2017) http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
gender_law/2017/06/sctous-denial-of-equal-protection-remedy-jeopardizes-equality-law-what-was-
justice-ginsburg-thinking.html [https://perma.cc/2HJA-X9H2]; The Judgment in Morales-Santana 
(SCOTUS Symposium), PRAWSBLAWG (June 13, 2017) http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2017/06/the-judgment-in-morales-santana-scotus-symposium.html 
[https://perma.cc/T65F-XTJX] (online symposium).  
2. Michael Dorf, Equal Protection and Leveling Down as Schadenfreude, DORF ON LAW
BLOG (June 14, 2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/equal-protection-and-leveling-down-
as.html?m=1 [https://perma.cc/MM9K-ALL2]; Ian Smith, Morales-Santana and the “Mean Remedy”, 
TAKECAREBLOG (June 12, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/morales-santana-and-the-mean-
remedy [https://perma.cc/NHU2-4VVM].  
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Yet this is problematic. Not only for the plaintiff, but also for the courts. 
Recognizing that there are multiple options, raises the question of how to 
justify the choice between them. If the Constitution is silent, what 
“judicially manageable standards” are there to guide the remedial 
calculus? Much has been written about that question, but the need for 
clarity has remained.3 Still, there is one consolation: American judges are 
not alone. Throughout the western world, courts struggle with this issue. 
Judges in many legal systems have increasingly been engaged in a rights 
revolution, and equal treatment norms have been central to that 
enterprise.4 In doing so, they are frequently confronted with similar 
dilemmas as raised in Morales-Santana.5 What is striking however, is that 
there is very little comparative literature on the ways in which courts deal 
with this dilemma.6 
This contribution seeks to remedy this omission. It does not attempt 
to contribute to the American debate about Sessions v. Morales-Santana. 
U.S. scholars do not need the Dutch to explain or ridicule their own cases.7 
Instead I aim to broaden the debate by putting Morales-Santana in a 
comparative perspective. I discuss alternative judicial approaches to 
underinclusive legislation, and I briefly assess those approaches 
normatively, using the right to a remedy as a modest touchstone. My 
argument will be that there is, at present, no single “best” approach, and 
that a flexible approach based on proportionality and balancing is 
warranted. 
3. See, e.g., Bruce K. Miller, Constitutional Remedies For Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical 
Appraisal of Heckler v. Mathews, 20 HARVARD CIV. RIGHTS & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 79 (1985); 
Bruce K. Miller & Neal Devins, Constitutional Rights Without Remedies: Judicial Review of 
Underinclusive Legislation, 70 JUDICATURE 151 (1986); Evan H. Caminker, A Norm-Based Remedial 
Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 1185 (1985); David M. Bizar, Remedying 
Underinclusive Entitlement Statutes: Lessons from a Contrast of the Canadian and U.S. Doctrines, 
24 U. MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 121 (1992). 
4. A. von Bogdandy, The Past and Promise of Doctrinal Constructivism: A Strategy for
Responding to the Challenges facing Constitutional Scholarship in Europe, 7 INT’L L.J. CON LAW 
364 (2009); Janneke H. Gerards, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EQUAL TREATMENT CASES (2005). 
5. See H. Maurer, Zur Verfassungswidrigerklärung von Gesetzen, IM DIENST AN RECHT UND 
STAAT 345-368 (H. Schneider & V. Gotz eds., 1974); Jörn Ipsen, RECHTSFOLGEN DER 
VERFASSUNGSWIDRIGKEIT VON NORM UND EINZELAKT 190 (1980) (German context); Gerards, supra 
note 4 (Dutch Context); Nitya Duclos & Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies as “Constitutional 
Hints – A Comment on R. v. Schachter, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1 (1991) (Canadian Context). 
6. Bizar, supra note 3 (A notable exception is the work of Bizar). 
7. Indeed, for an in-depth critique of Sessions v. Santana-Morales, see Tracy Thomas, Level 
Down Gender Equality (April 25, 2018) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3157987).  
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I. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 
In this section, I discuss the different ways in which courts in several 
jurisdictions have approached the remedial question when confronted 
with underinclusive legislation. What follows is not a systematic 
comparative account. The case law of the U.S. Supreme Court is set 
against some alternative paths taken by courts in other jurisdictions. These 
include western liberal democracies that are roughly comparable to the 
United States, in terms of shared constitutional values, such as the 
separation of powers, human rights protection, and effective judicial 
review. The judicial role in these jurisdictions may vary somewhat across 
the spectrum of strong-form and weak-form review.8 However, courts in 
all the jurisdictions included are empowered to set aside legislation if it 
violates norms of either constitutional or public international law.9 I 
distinguish four approaches: the second-guessing approach (which is 
regularly taken by U.S. courts) and three alternative paths: the rights-
based approach, the separation of powers approach, and the dialogical 
model. 
A. The Second-Guessing Approach 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Sessions v. Morales-Santana 
is fairly illustrative of the standard American remedial approach to 
underinclusive legislation, which is based on legislative intent.10 The 
starting point of this approach is a threefold assumption. First, that equal 
treatment norms as such do not dictate a choice for either extending or 
nullifying the benefit.11 Second, that the choice between extending or 
eliminating the benefit belongs to the courts and is not just a matter of 
policy (as we will see, this latter assumption is not universally shared). 
8. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1225 (M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
9. See GW. [Constitution] art. 120, 94 (Dutch courts are enjoined from constitutional review
of statutes, but they are empowered to strong-form review based on international (human rights) law); 
See Jerfi Uzman, Tom Barkhuysen & Michiel L. van Emmerik, The Dutch Supreme Court: A 
Reluctant Positive Legislator, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS 645 (Alan 
Brewer-Carias ed., 2011). 
10. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U. S. 320, 330 (2006) (“the 
touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent”). 
11. Although generally true, there are important exceptions. If the standard of future treatment 
for the advantaged class is unalterably fixed, judicial choice is limited to extending the benefit to the 
disadvantaged class. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); United States v. Wiltberger, 
18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820) (Furthermore, judicial expansion of criminal offences runs counter to nulla 
poena sine lege; See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972) (When a law discriminates 
by exempting certain groups from an offence, courts must extend the exemption.) 
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And third, that the option of nullification can ultimately be considered an 
appropriate remedy, be it perhaps not a nice one.12 
These assumptions originate from a concurring opinion of Justice 
Harlan in Welsh v. United States, in which he argued that: 
Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two 
remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order 
that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to 
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who 
are aggrieved by exclusion.13 
Harlan also laid the ground work for the idea that the choice between those 
two options was determined by legislative intent saying, “the boundaries 
of permissible choice may properly be considered fixed by the legislative 
pronouncement on severability.”14 The Supreme Court seemingly adopted 
this approach nine years later in Califano v. Westcott, when it considered 
a severability clause decisive justification for extending a financial aid 
program.15 However, in this case, such an extension was uncontroversial. 
In 1984, the Court more clearly confirmed the importance of 
Congressional intent. It reiterated that the court should not “use its 
remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.”16 Perhaps 
more importantly, the Supreme Court made it clear that it is within the 
judicial competence to choose either of the two remedial paths: levelling-
up or down. Although extension is the preferred option, the Court stressed 
that it considers it an adequate judicial remedy to withdraw benefits from 
the favored class.17 
This approach, focusing on legislative intent, is not uncontroversial. 
It raises the question of whose legislative intent should be considered 
decisive: the legislature enacting the statute or the current legislature?18 
The conventional view assumes the former: courts should focus on 
Congress at the time when it passed the law. Otherwise one could hardly 
12. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 566 -567 (1974); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 
U.S. 728, 739 (1984) (fn. 8), quoting Justice Brandeis in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 
284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931). 
13. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 362 (1970). 
14. Id. at 364. 
15. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-90 (1979). 
16. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 (fn. 5) (quoting Justice Powell’s concurrence in
Califano v. Westcott). 
17. Id. at 740 (fn. 8).
18. This question apparently sparked some discussion among the current members of the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-1191, p. 45-48, Sessions v. Morales-
Santana, 582 U.S. __ (2017) (transcript of the discussion between Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Bader Ginsburg and Breyer during oral argument).  
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maintain that the courts are implementing congressional intent.19 The 
basis for this approach, thus seems to be rooted in a specific understanding 
of the rule of law, in which the courts implement legislative will to the 
extent that it is constitutional. One problem is that there usually is no way 
of establishing for certain what Congress would have wanted, had it been 
aware of any constitutional defect. This decision always involves a 
(varying) degree of second-guessing. Absent fallback or severability 
clauses, the Supreme Court usually employs presumptions to determine 
legislative intent.20 They serve to identify the policy objectives behind the 
legislative scheme. Thus, the relative size of both groups, the 
consequences of extension for the budget, or the fact that extending would 
lead to discrimination of a third group, may be relevant factors to 
consider.21 Still, these presumptions can only provide circumstantial 
evidence at best.22 
A second problem, is that what Congress wanted the odd 40 years 
ago is frequently rooted in a specific historical understanding of society, 
which was at the heart of the unconstitutionality. It seems strained to 
separate the legislative elements that are nowadays considered to be 
discriminatory, from other elements of a given regulatory scheme. If, in 
1950, Congress would allow women, but not men, in the military to take 
six years of paid leave for taking care of young children, then such a 
scheme is embedded in a very specific understanding of the role of 
motherhood, the relationship between women and the military, and the 
desirability of promoting traditional family values. To ask what Congress 
would have wanted had it been aware that such a difference between men 
and women was unconstitutional would, in a sense, constitute an 
invitation to rewrite history. It would thus make sense to search for 
alternative remedial paths. 
B. The Rights-Based Approach 
In stark contrast to the second-guessing approach, stands what we 
might call the rights-based approach of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ).23 The ECJ is of course in a very different 
19. Id. at p. 47, Roberts C.J. 
20. Caminker, supra note 3, at 1189. 
21. Id. at 1189, 1208. 
22. Id. at 1188-1189. 
23. This rights-based approach shares some similarities with but should be distinguished from 
the norm-based model as was advocated by Evan Caminker (Caminker, supra note 3). 
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constitutional position as compared to the United States Supreme Court.24 
First of all, it is not (yet) considered the highest court of a (federal) nation 
state, although the EU has some federal features.25 Nor is it in any formal 
kind of hierarchical position vis-à-vis member state courts. Unlike the 
U.S. Supreme Court, it has no appellate jurisdiction over state courts.26 
But again, the difference between the two courts should not be overstated. 
In practice, the ECJ has considerable power over national courts of the 
member states when it comes to applying EU law.27 It essentially performs 
two functions: it acts both as a supreme administrative and constitutional 
court for the Union itself, and as the guardian of the uniform application 
of EU Law by national courts. In short, there are thus two ways for the 
ECJ to get involved in reviewing legislation against equal protection law. 
First, it may itself review, and subsequently nullify, EU legislation for 
failing to comply with the EU Treaties (including the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights). Moreover, it supervises national courts when they 
apply EU Law.28 This implies that the ECJ’s oversees, not only whether 
national courts apply EU Law correctly, but also whether they provide 
sufficient effective legal protection as required by Union law. When 
national legislation violates European equal treatment law, the question of 
how courts should proceed from a remedial perspective is thus, in theory, 
a shared responsibility of both the highest domestic courts and the ECJ. 
In practice however, the ECJ has strengthened its role by framing the 
remedial issue as a matter of supremacy of the EU-Treaties, which, 
according to its settled case law, take precedence over any kind of 
domestic law including national constitutions.29 The remedial question is, 
in short, largely answered by the ECJ. 
So, what does the “European” approach of the ECJ look like? Very 
different, to be sure. The European Court effectively denies one of the 
fundamental assumptions underpinning the second-guessing approach, 
namely the fact that the courts actually have a choice. By contrast, the ECJ 
24. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INT’L. J. CON. LAW 618 (2006). 
25. See, e.g., Stefan Oeter, Federalism and Democracy, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55, 56 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2009). 
26. See, e.g., Jan Komárek, Precedent and Judicial Lawmaking in Supreme Courts: The Court 
of Justice Compared to the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de Cassation, 11 CAMBRIDGE 
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 399, 409 (2009). 
27. See Jan Komárek, Federal elements in the community judicial system: building coherence 
in the community legal order, 42 COMMON MARKET LAW REV. 9 (2005). 
28. See e.g. Rob van Gestel & Jurgen de Poorter, Supreme administrative courts’ preliminary 
questions to the CJEU: start of a dialogue or talking to deaf ears?, 6 CAMBRIDGE INT. LAW JOURNAL 
122 (2017). 
29. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629.
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consistently rules that victims of underinclusive legislation must be 
treated in the same way and made subject to the same arrangements as the 
advantaged class, because in the eyes of the ECJ, these arrangements form 
the only valid point of reference.30 The Court recognizes, of course, that 
the legislature remains free to choose a different path to achieve equal 
treatment, but as long as legislators have not done so, the courts have no 
other option than to extend the existing benefits.31 
The ECJ has never clarified why it considers extending the only 
option. That is problematic, but not surprising given the ECJ’s frugal 
argumentative style as compared to U.S. judicial reasoning.32 One 
explanation might be that these judgments are pronounced in the context 
of the ECJ’s task of supervising domestic courts. It may be that the Court 
uses the strict obligation to level-up as a strategic tool to force member 
states to faithfully comply with EU (equal treatment) law. Such an 
incentive may sometimes be called for due to the tendency of some 
domestic courts to treat EU law as a foreign body of law. The level-up 
remedy then serves as quasi punitive damages.33 Basically, what the ECJ 
might say is: “if you mess up, we are not going to save you.” 
There may be some truth in such a strategic explanation. However, 
one would then expect the ECJ to take a different view when it reviews 
Union law for compliance with the EU-Treaties. After all, there are no 
domestic courts involved in such an exercise, just Community institutions. 
And indeed, the early case law of the Court displays a cautious attitude 
towards the EU legislature. In 1977, it declared a regulation which 
provided a fiscal refund scheme for some products made from maize, but 
not for others to violate the constitutional principle of equality.34 
However, the Court refrained from invalidating the refund scheme, nor 
30. See, e.g., Terhoeve v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Particulieren/Ondernemingen
buitenland, 1999 E.C.R. I-345, at 57 (domestic courts should extend tax scheme to both residents and 
non-residents). The roots of this approach originate from: The Netherlands v. Federatie Nederlandse 
Vakbeweging, 1986 E.C.R. 3855, at 22 (women should enjoy same unemployment benefits as men). 
See also Specht v. City of Berlin, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2005, at 93-95 (difference of treatment in 
civil servants pay is unjustified, but may continue for a while for lack of clear framework of 
reference); Milkova v. Director of Privatization, 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:198, at 66-67 (domestic 
courts should extend scheme for employees with disabilities to civil servants with disabilities).  
31. Michael Dougan, NATIONAL REMEDIES BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE: ISSUES OF
HARMONISATION AND DIFFERENTIATION 20 (Hart Publishing 2004).  
32. See, e.g., Mitchel Lasser, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (Oxford University Press 2009); Komárek, supra note 26, at 409. 
33. J.H. Jans, S. Prechal & R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, EUROPEANISATION OF PUBLIC LAW 184 
(GroningenL Europa Law Publishing, 2nd ed. 2015).  
34. Ruckdeschel & Co v. Customs Office Hamburg-St. Annen, 1977 E.C.R. 1753. See also 
Société des Fonderies de Pont-à-Mousson v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, 1959 E.C.R. 215. 
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did it extend it to disadvantaged manufacturers. Instead, it considered that 
there were several courses of action that would lead to the elimination of 
the inequality, and it was “for the institutions responsible for the common 
agricultural policy to assess” the necessary choice of action.35 In the 
meantime, the regulation, with its inequality, would remain in force. In 
later years, however, the Court seems to have abandoned that approach. It 
still insisted that it was up to the community legislature to adopt “such 
measures as may be appropriate in order to establish equal treatment.”36 
However, pending the adoption of the new rules, “the competent 
authorities must continue to apply the exemption provided for in the 
provision declared invalid but they must also grant it to the operators 
affected by the discrimination found to exist.”37 It is this approach that has 
survived over the years. Thus, in a landmark case about passenger rights 
in aviation, the Court considered a difference in treatment in an EU 
regulation between the rights of passengers whose flights was delayed, as 
opposed to those whose flights were cancelled, arbitrary and thus a breach 
of the principle of equality. This time it did not even make any reference 
to the role of the European legislature. Instead, by way of interpretation, 
it simply extended the rules for passengers of annulled flights to the group 
of passengers whose flights were delayed for more than three hours.38 In 
short, it seems irrelevant whether the inequality originates in the law of 
the member states, or in EU law itself. 
Rather than a strategic tool to influence domestic actors, it seems that 
the Court simply regards extending to be the only legitimate way forward 
for the courts. This view may, alternatively, be explained by the Court’s 
repeated emphasis on two other principles that are considered 
fundamental to EU law: legal certainty and effective legal protection. It 
might be that the Court simply considers nullification of benefits for third 
parties as contrary to the judicial function. Such a view has been defended 
in the domestic constitutional law of some European member states.39 
However, this theory is neither uncontroversial nor widely followed. It 
has been rejected on the grounds that such a rigid insistence on extending 
35. Id. at 1772. 
36. Van Landschoot v. Mera, 1988 E.C.R. 3456, at 3463 (no. 22). 
37. Id. at 3465. 
38. Sturgeon v. Condor Flugdienst, 2009 E.C.R. I-10923. 
39. See, e.g., Pieter van Dijk, De houding van de Hoge Raad jegens de verdragen inzake de
rechten van de mens, DE PLAATS VAN DE HOGE RAAD IN HET HUIDIGE STAATSBESTEL 173-209 
(Zwolle, B. Baardman ed. 1988) (arguing, unfortunately in Dutch, that only legislatures are 
empowered to withdraw existing rights from persons that are not party to the litigation). 
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is highly unworkable in practice.40 And yet, the principled view that 
recognizing multiple acceptable policy outcomes, does not imply a 
judicial choice between those outcomes, remains somewhat attractive. 
C. The Separation of Powers Approach 
Courts applying the separation of powers approach follow a similar 
reasoning to the U.S Supreme Court. They assume that equal treatment 
does not dictate a specific policy outcome. Moreover, like SCOTUS, they 
consider levelling down, be it reluctantly, to be an adequate judicial 
remedy. However, these courts consider the choice between levelling-up 
or down a political decision that should be left to the legislature. They stay 
well out of the way of political decision making, and thus refuse to provide 
any remedy at all other than declaratory relief. One finds this approach in 
the Netherlands, but also by some members of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Indeed, it seems to be advocated by Justices Thomas and Alito in Sessions 
v. Morales-Santana.41
The classic example is a judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court in 
the 1980’s, ironically also about a discriminatory scheme for acquiring 
citizenship. In those days, the law on Dutch citizenship granted foreign 
women married to a Dutch (male) citizen the right to acquire Dutch 
nationality by a simple formal declaration. However, the same kind of 
generosity was not bestowed upon foreign husbands of female citizens.42 
When this law was challenged on grounds of non-discrimination, the 
Dutch Supreme Court declined to review it.43 It considered that to 
abrogate the right for women was just as lawful as extending the right to 
men, and to choose between the two options would be to encroach upon 
the political prerogative of Parliament. Thus, because the court would be 
unable to provide redress, it saw no reason to proceed any further. And 
so, the Court left open the question whether the statutory provision 
violated a non-discrimination clause and it turned down the plaintiffs 
claim. 
40. S.K. Martens, De grenzen van de rechtsvormende taak van de rechter, 75 NEDERLANDS 
JURISTENBLAD 2000, 747 (2012). 
41. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring).
42. It may be interesting to note, although hardly relevant for our present inquiry, that this was 
a very deliberate legislative choice. Both the government and Parliament expressly considered women 
with foreign husbands ‘irrational’, ‘not morally impeccable’ and possible victims of ‘foreign fortune 
hunters’. For those who read Dutch, see Betty de Hart, ‘ONBEZONNEN VROUWEN’: GEMENGDE 
RELATIES IN HET NATIONALITEITSRECHT EN HET VREEMDELINGENRECHT (“‘IRRATIONAL WOMEN’: 
MIXED RELATIONSHIPS IN IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW’) 218 (Amsterdam 2003). 
43. SCN judgment of 12 Oct. 1984, NJ 1985/230, ECLI:NL:HR:1984:AG4874 (Citizenship 
Case). 
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The Court was widely criticized for its Citizenship Judgment, both 
for its refusal to review the merits of the case and the lack of a remedy.44 
In 1998, it responded to its critics in a landmark judgment about an 
underinclusive tax exemption.45 This time, the Court expressly considered 
that the impugned law violated international equal treatment law. It then 
examined whether it could provide relief, stressing that this question 
warranted a careful balancing of two principles: effective legal protection 
and the need for judicial restraint. The result, the Court concluded, was 
that it would provide relief unless that would involve policy making or 
political choices. If that were the case, the courts should leave the matter 
for Parliament, at least for the time being.46 This last remark is important: 
it shows that the Court does consider the judiciary ultimately empowered 
to decide the remedial issue when Parliament knowingly leaves the 
violation intact. Rather, its restraint is of a relative nature: it is a matter of 
judicial policy, rather than of competence. However, although the Dutch 
legislature has often been slow to respond, the Court has never actually 
intervened. Moreover, the Court does not require the legislature to deal 
with past violations or attach retroactive effect to its amendments.47 
Needless to say, this may have serious consequences for the victims of 
ongoing unequal treatment. 
The fact that the Dutch courts consider their approach as one of 
restraint, rather than of competence, stands in stark contrast to the 
somewhat comparable approach advocated by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas. In Miller v. Albright, Justice Scalia argued, along the same lines 
as the reasoning of the Dutch Court, “that the complaint should be 
dismissed because the courts had no power to provide the relief 
requested.”48 He went on to add that, “It is in my view incompatible with 
the plenary power of Congress . . . for judges to speculate as to what 
Congress would have enacted if it had not enacted what it did.”49 This 
comes very close to the approach taken by the Dutch Supreme Court in its 
Citizenship Case of 1984: because the courts should not second-guess 
44. Erika de Wet, The Reception Process in the Netherlands and Belgium, A EUROPE OF
RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 229, 241 (H. Keller & A. Stone 
Sweet eds., Oxford University Press 2008).  
45. SCN judgment of 12 May 1999, NJ 2000/170 (Labour expenses deduction).
46. Id. para. 3.15. 
47. E.g., SCN judgment of 14 June 2002, BNB 2002/289, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:ZC8146
(Labour deduction II). 
48. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 422 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 457. 
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legislative intent, it is inappropriate to reach the merits of the case.50 Both 
approaches clearly appeal to separation of powers concerns. Moreover, 
they both hint vaguely at some political question doctrine, be it in different 
ways. Justice Scalia seems to suggest that immigration and citizenship are 
fields that are constitutionally reserved for a coordinate branch.51 The 
Dutch Supreme Court, on the other hand, is more concerned with a lack 
of judicially discoverable standards to choose between levelling-up or 
down.52 Moreover, as I remarked before, where Justice Scalia framed the 
matter as one of competence, the Dutch Supreme Court was careful to 
emphasize that its restraint was a matter of constitutional courtesy. This 
difference seems perhaps somewhat formalistic, but it is significant. 
D. The Dialogic Approach 
There has been a fair amount of talk about constitutional dialogue 
lately. The modern use of the metaphor, which originates from Canadian 
constitutional law, continues to dominate the debate on constitutionalism 
and judicial review.53 The concept has many dimensions, one of which is 
the notion of remedial dialogue: the idea that the shaping of judicial 
remedies may contribute to a meaningful dialogue between courts and 
legislature.54 Using the temporal effects of their judgments, courts may 
allow legislatures time to remedy defective legislation. This should 
achieve a unique balance between the competing ideals of effective rights 
protection and democratic self-determination. Leaving aside the matter of 
whether that is actually realistic, I discuss two examples of remedial 
dialogue in the context of underinclusiveness, drawn from two very 
different courts: the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany (the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or 
BVerfG). 
50. SCN judgment of 12 Oct. 1984, NJ 1985/230, ECLI:NL:HR:1984:AG4874 (Citizenship 
Case). 
51. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961). 
52. Id. at 226. 
53. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue between Courts and
Legislatures (or perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a bad Thing after All), 35 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 75 (1997); Kent Roach, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC 
DIALOGUE (Toronto 2001). 
54. The work of Kent Roach is of fundamental in this respect: See, e.g., Remedial Consensus
and Dialogue under the Charter: General Declarations and Delayed Declarations of Invalidity, 35 
U.B.C. L. REV. 211 (2001); Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues 
About Rights: The Canadian Experience, 40 TEXAS INT. L.J. 537 (2005). 
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i. The Supreme Court of Canada
When confronted with underinclusive legislation, Canadian courts 
traditionally focus on legislative intent.55 In the 1992 landmark case of 
Schachter v. Canada, then Chief Justice Antonio Lamer listed five 
remedial options while recognizing that “a court has flexibility in 
determining what course of action to take following a violation of the 
Charter [of Rights and Freedoms, JU].”56 Guidance could be drawn from 
the hypothetical preferences of the legislature. To that end, the judgment 
extensively discussed a range of factors that were indicative of legislative 
preferences, such as budgetary considerations and the relative size of the 
two groups involved.57 However, in the case at hand (concerning a social 
assistance scheme which distinguished between natural and adoptive 
parents), the Court concluded that ascertaining the legislative objectives 
was difficult.58 Lamer C.J. stressed that the Court should be weary of 
extending benefits under these circumstances.59 Invalidation of the 
scheme was the appropriate remedy. However, he also observed that 
striking down would deprive eligible persons of a benefit without 
providing any relief to the respondent. He solved that difficulty by turning 
to a device he had developed seven years earlier in Re Manitoba Language 
Rights.60 In that case, the Court had suspended its declaration of invalidity 
in order to give the legislature time to work out a solution. In Schachter, 
Lamer C.J. argues at length that delayed declarations should be considered 
exceptional, given that they allow a finding of unconstitutionality to 
persist. Only when a declaration of invalidity threatens public safety or 
the rule of law, may it be considered appropriate.61 The Court then 
conveniently added one other category: delayed declarations of invalidity 
could also be appropriate when the law under review is underinclusive 
and striking it down would result in the loss of rights by third parties. 
The Court, in Schachter, stressed that “the question whether to delay 
the application of a declaration of nullity should turn not on considerations 
of the role of the courts and the legislature but rather on considerations 
relating to the effect of an immediate declaration on the public.”62 And 
55. See, e.g., Eric S. Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA LAW REV. 322, 340
(2016). 
56. Schachter v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 679, 695 (1992). 
57. Id. at 709, 711. 
58. Id. at 722. 
59. Id. at 723. 
60. Re Manitoba Language Rights, 1 S.C.R. 721 (1985). See also R. v. Swain, 1 S.C.R. 933
(1991).  
61. Schachter, 2 S.C.R. at 715-716. 
62. Id. at 717. 
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yet, in later years, Canadian courts seem to have abandoned this approach 
in practice, if not in theory. They rarely justify delaying their judgments 
with reference to the costs of legal discontinuity, nor do they weigh those 
costs against the costs of temporarily maintaining an unconstitutional state 
of affairs.63 It rather seems as if Canadian courts no longer regard 
suspension as an emergency measure but rather as a standard dialogic 
device to remand sensitive issues to the legislature for consideration. This 
allows them to circumvent the difficult choice that U.S. courts face, but it 
also protects them, at least to some extent, from many of the downsides 
of the rights-based approach (which can have immense budgetary 
implications) or the separation of powers approach (which falls short in 
terms of effective legal protection). 
ii. The German Constitutional Court
The innovative approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada has 
been met with much enthusiasm in other parts of the world. Several courts 
have carried out similar experiments.64 But perhaps the most interesting 
example in terms of comparison comes from a jurisdiction where remedial 
delay has been around for more than 50 years, without actually calling it 
dialogue. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (FCC) has always 
maintained that unconstitutional laws are automatically void.65 And yet 
since 1961, it regularly turns a blind eye when confronted with 
underinclusive legislation. In those cases, instead of declaring legislation 
invalid, it declares it “merely unconstitutional” (“bloβ 
verfassungswirdig”).66 Usually such a declaration is accompanied by 
some kind of interim arrangement. This arrangement applies until the 
legislature has replaced it with a scheme of its own. A mere declaration 
of unconstitutionality does not affect the validity of the law, but it does 
usually trigger a situation in which courts and agencies may no longer 
apply it to existing and future cases.67 Moreover, they should suspend 
those existing cases until Parliament has replaced the unconstitutional 
63. Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, Putting the Past Behind Us? Prospective Judicial and
Legislative Constitutional Remedies, 21 SUPREME COURT LAW REV. 205, 232 (2003). 
64. See e.g. the judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Minister of Home
Affairs v. Fourie, 1 S.A. 524 (2006) (Court grants Parliament a grace period in order to implement 
same-sex marriage). See also: Holning Lau, Comparative Perspectives on Strategic Remedial Delays, 
91 TULANE L. REV. 259 (2016). (noting the strategic use of remedial delay in this case). 
65. See e.g.: the Südweststaat (‘Southwest State’) judgment of the FCC, 1 BVerfG 14 (1951). 
66. See BVerfGE 13, 248 (1961) (judgment of December 13, 1961). 
67. BVerfGE 317, 217 (1974) (Desecendants nationality judgment). 
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norm, at which time they should decide these cases under the new rule or, 
if applicable, under any transitional scheme the legislature has devised.68 
That is the general rule. However, the FCC sometimes, by way of 
interim measure, proclaims that the unconstitutional norm continues to be 
applicable, be it modified and only for a certain amount of time.69 Thus, 
in a case in which the legislature had discriminated between married 
couples and registered partners for the purposes of a fiscal scheme, the 
Court ordered the continued application of the scheme for married couples 
in the interest of legal certainty. It ordered however, that by way of interim 
measure, the courts were to temporarily extend the benefit to registered 
partners.70 Similarly, in a case somewhat comparable to Sessions v. 
Morales-Santana, it considered it necessary, given the fundamental 
importance of clarity about the status of nationality for children, to order 
the continued application of a law that conferred German nationality to 
descendants of German fathers, but not of German mothers.71 However, 
it added specific instructions, which essentially secured that all children 
born before the entry into force of the new legislation would ultimately 
secure German citizenship. 
The German Constitutional Court is, compared to the Supreme Court 
of Canada, far more vocal about the legislative duties following a 
declaration of unconstitutionality, meticulously supervising the legislative 
process. Parliament is under a legal obligation to change the law.72 
Moreover, the FCC has explicitly ruled that the new rule should have 
retroactive effect, at least to the date of the FCC’s original judgment.73 
The period before the FCC’s judgment is covered by a more flexible 
regime: Parliament can, in some circumstances, be required to make some 
kind of arrangement for the victims of the unconstitutionality, but this 
need not necessarily amount to full reparation.74 What the Court basically 
does, is that it balances the need to provide redress to the victims of an 
unconstitutionality with other legitimate interests, such as the rights of 
third parties and the need for sound public finance.75 
All this is to secure legislative involvement in the remedial process, 
while at the same time safeguarding, as much as possible, the rights of 
both the litigants and those who are in a comparable position. Mere 
68. Id. 
69. The landmark judgment is: BVerfGE 119, 331 (Hartz IV).
70. BVerfGE 133, 377 (2013). 
71. BVerfGE 317, 217 (1974).
72. BVerfGE at 217; BVerfGE 82, 126 (Notice period judgment). 
73. BVerfGE 87, 114 (1992) (Allotments judgment). 
74. Id; see also, BVerfGE 133, 377 (2013) (Married couples and registered partners judgment). 
75. See e.g., BVerfGE 87, 153 (1992) (Basic subsistence minimum judgment). 
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declarations nowadays constitute a very substantial percentage of the 
FCC’s findings of unconstitutionality. However, this practice has 
remained controversial. It has been criticized as too activist by those who 
consider the judicial interim measures as too great an intrusion to the 
legislative sphere.76 Others, by contrast, complain that the Court does too 
little to meet its judicial obligation to provide effective redress.77 That last 
question is particularly relevant for the topic of our present inquiry, and it 
is to the principle of effective legal protection I now turn. 
II. IUS UBI, IBI REMEDIUM AS AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
Having outlined four different approaches to the problem of 
underinclusive legislation, the question presents itself: which one is best? 
Unfortunately, this short essay is hardly the place to flesh out a normative 
theory capable of evaluation. Its chief purpose was to broaden the debate 
on Morales-Santana by bringing in a comparative perspective. However, 
it would be very impolite to the reader not to offer some brief thoughts on 
the normative aspect. In order to do this, we shall need some kind of 
framework. Such a framework may be found in the principle of effective 
legal protection, more commonly referred to by the Latin maxim Ubi Ius, 
Ibi Remedium.78 This principle is part of constitutional heritage in many 
parts of the world. Widely considered a vital part of the rule of law, it is 
included in many constitutions.79 In the common law world it has long 
been, “a settled and invariable principle . . . that every right, when 
withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”80 So 
much so, that it became an inextricable part of U.S. constitutional history 
76. E.g. R. Lamprecht, Oligarchie in Karlsruhe: Über die Erosion der Gewaltenteilung
(‘Oligarchy in Karlsruhe: About the Erosion of the Separation of Powers’), 47 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 3272 (1994). 
77. Michael Sachs, Bloβe Unvereinbarerklärung bei Gleichheitsverstöβen? Probleme einer
Entscheidungspraxis des BVerfG (‘Mere Declarations of Incompatibility for Violations of Non-
Discrimination? Problems of a Remedial Practice of the FCC’), 1 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
VERWALTUNGSRECHT (NVWZ) 657 (1982); Michael Sachs, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 
(‘CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE’) 60 (Heidelberg 2004). 
78. See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy 
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004). See also Tracy Thomas, Leveling Down 
Equality, 9 CONLAWNOW [2018] [forthcoming], for a very similar approach from a domestic 
perspective. 
79. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 465 (Oxford
University Press 2005); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art 19.4; C.E., B.O.E. n. 53.2 (Spain); 
Constitucíon Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, art. 103, Diario Oficial de la 
Federacíon [DOF] 05-02-1917 (Mex.). 
80. William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES IN THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (Oxford University
Press 1765).  
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when Chief Justice Marshall quoted it in Marbury v. Madison.81 Its 
importance is highlighted, moreover, by the fact that it is considered a 
core human right, featuring in several international conventions.82 
Ius ubi, ibi remedium is important, but it is also a highly complex 
fundamental right. On its face, it gives the impression of absoluteness. 
Most documents, either in constitutional or in public international law, fail 
to include any limitation clause to the right to a remedy. Moreover, in 
many cases, such as Marbury v. Madison, the principle is presented as an 
unyielding imperative. However, as Fallon and Meltzer have rightly 
stressed, this “apparent promise of effective redress for all constitutional 
violations reflects a principle, not an ironclad rule, and its ideal is not 
always attained.”83 Or, as Dinah Shelton observed in the context of 
international human rights law: “[t]he latin maxim ubi jus ibi 
remedium . . . is not, and perhaps cannot be, strictly observed in practice. 
Rights have gone unremedied in the past, and some will go unremedied in 
the future.”84 The law of constitutional remedies is, by definition 
imperfect, the great promises of Blackstone, constitutions, and human 
rights notwithstanding. Effective legal protection is, in other words, a 
qualified right. This means that the principle allows itself to be balanced 
against other principles, such as legal certainty, the separation of powers, 
and democratic self-governance. But how should we reconcile this with 
the principle’s unyielding aura? 
The answer lies in, what one might call, a functional approach to 
effective legal protection. Constitutional remedies basically perform two 
legal functions.85 On a microlevel they prescribe full reparation of 
individual violations and measures to secure future norm compliance. On 
a more structural level, they also serve to reinforce the rule of law. Both 
constitutions and human rights instruments presuppose a functioning 
institutional system that is designed to ensure that governments respect 
constitutional values and generally act within the boundaries of the law. 
As Fallon and Meltzer have rightly stressed: “Of the two functions 
performed by constitutional remedies, providing effective remediation to 
individual victims is the more familiar, but ensuring governmental 
faithfulness to law is, if not the more fundamental, at least the more 
81. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). 
82. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2.3; European
Convention on Human Rights, art. 13; Inter-American Convention, art. 25.  
83. Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARVARD L. REV. 1731, 1778 (1991). 
84. Shelton, supra note 79, at 21. 
85. I derive this account from Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 83, at 1787. 
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unyielding.”86 Distinguishing between these two sides of the coin may be 
helpful to identify the interaction between the two. Although the 
microlevel function allows for balancing, whereas at the macrolevel, the 
principle is virtually absolute, the latter’s unyielding character does 
influence this microlevel balancing exercise. In other words, the 
consequences of a specific case for the protection of a given right at the 
structural level may raise the weight of providing a remedy at the 
microlevel. 
Furthermore, the fundamental right to a remedy may also perform a 
more socio-theoretical function in that it forces the main protectors of 
rights, the courts, to rationally justify the outcome of this balancing 
exercise. Human rights institute, what German scholar Mattias Kumm has 
referred to as “a practice of Socratic contestation”: they require the 
authorities to give sound reasons for their claims.87 The way it works is 
that courts, using proportionality as a framework of reference, critically 
scrutinize legislative or executive claims underpinning the exercise of 
power. Such “Socratic questioning” may reveal “a great deal of 
thoughtlessness, platitudes, conventions, or brute power-mongering that 
dresses up as wisdom, but falls together like a house of cards when pressed 
for justifications.”88 Usually this “rationalist human rights paradigm” is 
enforced by the courts vis-à-vis governments and legislatures.89 However, 
there is no reason why it should not also be applied to the judicial function 
itself. In the context of the duty to provide effective remedies, this means 
that courts must justify their remedial choices with reference to concrete 
and, as much as possible, evidence-based reasons.90 The proportionality 
test, as it is used—in one form or another—may serve as a useful tool to 
guide this exercise.91 
What this all means for present purposes, is that we should first 
recognize that ius ubi, ibi remedium does allow for certain exceptions. 
However, these exceptions should be based upon a clear and specific 
countervailing principle. It is, for instance, possible that providing a 
86. Id. at 1789. 
87. Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point 
of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 140 (2010). 
88. Id. at 153. 
89. Mattias Kumm, Institutionalising Socratic Contestation: The Rationalist Human Rights
Paradigm, Legitimate Authority and the Point of Judicial Review, 1 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 2 (2007),  
90. Thomas, supra note 78, at 1643 (arguing for strict scrutiny when evaluating the denial of a 
remedy). 
91. See, e.g., Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere But
Here?, 22 DUKE J. OF INT. & COMPARATIVE LAW 291 (outlining the general structure of the 
proportionality principle). 
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specific remedy would be inconsistent with legal certainty (in case of 
withdrawing rights from third parties), or that striking down a 
discriminatory exception to a criminal offense for the advantaged class is 
prohibited by nulla poena sine lege. It is also possible that courts would 
want to avoid a specific remedial outcome out of respect for the 
legislature. These concerns are, however, far too abstract to justify 
remedial restraint as such. We need to specify precisely what the 
principles we identified dictate in a specific case. One might for instance, 
in the case concerning underinclusive legislation, argue that remedial 
restraint is based on a very specific substantive perception of the 
separation of powers, which grounds the necessity for judicial restraint in 
the idea of collective self-determination.92 In other words: the notion of 
collective self-determination dictates that courts should be wary of 
crafting remedies that impede on the primacy of the political process. 
However, that is only the first step of the analysis because then, the court 
will need to specify exactly why this principle dictates restraint in the 
specific context of the case at hand. Moreover, the exception to the right 
to a remedy should be narrowly construed in light of the specifics of the 
case at hand. There is no one size fits all outcome in constitutional 
remedies. 
III. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: SOME OBSERVATIONS
What does this all mean for the four approaches I identified before? 
The answer is fairly simple when it comes to the separation of powers 
approach taken by the Dutch courts. That approach, on the surface, seems 
to include a balancing of two principles: effective legal protection and 
judicial restraint. However, at closer sight, hardly any balancing takes 
place at all. Instead, there is a bright-line rule dictating that in cases of 
underinclusiveness, courts should leave the remedial matter for 
Parliament to decide. Even if Parliament would eventually change the law, 
it is unclear whether the original claimant would benefit of the new 
scheme. Moreover, it would be very unlikely indeed that victims of past 
violations would obtain redress. Such an approach thus immediately falls 
short in terms of effective legal protection. 
The American approach produces a more complicated picture. 
Obviously, a decision to level-up would not be problematic in terms of 
effective legal protection. With regard to the possibility of levelling-
down, one might argue that such a course of action would constitute an 
92. See Christoph Möllers, THE THREE BRANCHES: A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 92 (Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 2013). 
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adequate, be it a “mean” remedy. Thus, Michael Dorf argues that although 
the Court could not give Morales-Santana the relief he sought, it did 
ultimately issue a constitutionally adequate remedy.93 The reasoning 
behind this is that the victims of underinclusive legislation do not rely on 
a substantive constitutional value, they “just” want to be treated equally. 
Levelling-down would accomplish that. However, this reasoning is 
incomplete. It fails to recognize that the relevant point of reference is not 
future applications of the law, but past applications. If a court intends to 
remedy the situation levelling-down, it is required, not only to refuse the 
benefit to future applicants of the advantaged class, in order to achieve 
full equal treatment. It must also somehow “take back” what was already 
given. That is something the courts are fundamentally unequipped to do. 
Doctrines such as res iudicata and nulla poena sine lege would resist such 
a course. Thus, levelling-down is problematic under the right to an 
effective remedy. 
The second question is whether levelling down may still be justified 
because of the need to respect legislative intent. I hardly think it does. 
First of all, applying the framework set out previously, it is unclear exactly 
what justifies the second-guessing approach. Is it to enforce, as much as 
possible, the legislative will of a former legislature? Or is it to preserve 
the space for collective self-determination by the present legislature? And 
how can levelling-down really be said to serve collective self-
determination? Courts under the second-guessing approach tend to, well, 
second-guess. Their reasons for choosing either this way or that can 
seldom be evidence-based. Moreover, they need to rely on assumptions 
that are highly difficult to substantiate. This means that the second-
guessing approach may easily lead to arbitrariness. Last but not least, 
focusing on legislative intent makes it difficult to balance the different 
interests involved in the remedial calculus. What, for instance, if fear of 
levelling-down would lead to a chilling effect on litigation? Should adults 
think twice of arguing an age discrimination complaint in court 
concerning a law that exempts juveniles from life imprisonment?94 Or 
should a court steer well away of even finding a violation because it would 
otherwise have to take away the benefits of (vulnerable) third parties?95 
In other words, this is where the structural level of the right to a remedy 
93. Dorf, supra note 2. 
94. Khamtokhu & Aksenchik v. Russia, no. 60367/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017). 
95. This is what eventually happened in Khamtokhu & Aksenchik. 
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comes into play.96 Such a perspective would dictate the courts involved to 
extending rather than to invalidating. 
Obviously, the rights-based approach is comparatively more 
favorable from a remedial perspective. Still, it can be problematic in terms 
of collective self-determination. Ironically, this approach suffers from the 
same lack of balancing as the others. By prescribing levelling-up as the 
only possible option, the ECJ runs the risk of overextending a relatively 
minor legislative scheme. That could seriously jeopardize legitimate 
government interests. Of course, such a course could still be justified, but 
the rights-based approach has no way of filtering unnecessary cases out. 
Again, the structural level of protecting constitutional rights is relevant 
here. Because if levelling-up is the only possible remedy, courts might 
well become excessively cautious when reviewing legislation. Of course, 
legislatures can respond by enacting new legislation, but they have a 
strong political incentive not to withdraw benefits. Moreover, such a “ping 
pong” effect between courts and legislature can have disruptive effects in 
terms of legal certainty. 
Finally, how should the dialogic approach be evaluated? First of all, 
the dialogic remedy does enjoy a few advantages over the other three 
approaches. It avoids the problem of second-guessing by referring the 
matter to the legislature, thus allowing room for collective self-
determination. Democratic self-determination is also distinctly better off 
under the dialogic model than under the rights-based approach because 
the legislature may balance the different interests involved, instead of 
having one automatic remedy bestowed upon it. Last but not least, 
although the dialogic and the separation of power approach share their 
aspiration of leaving the legislature room for maneuver, litigants under the 
dialogic model are distinctly better off. Unlike under the separation of 
powers approach, courts under the dialogical approach formulate a 
remedy which takes effect at some later point in time. Moreover, both the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the German FCC frequently (if not always) 
retain jurisdiction so that they may continue to supervise legislative 
deliberations. Both aspects greatly increase the chances of redress for the 
original claimants. 
And yet there remain some challenges for the dialogical model, the 
most important of which is the fact that the remedial quest under the 
dialogical model is in danger of being turned into a socio-political, rather 
than a legal enterprise. Theories underpinning the idea of constitutional 
96. See, Nitya Duclos & Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies as “Constitutional Hints”: A
Comment on R. v. Schachter, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1 (1991) for a similar approach.  
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dialogue usually focus on the structural level, rather than on the 
consequences for individual litigants. There is much to be said for such an 
approach.97 However, viewing the outcome of a case in terms of general 
policy, does come at a cost. It may result in the courts overlooking the 
position of the individual litigant, whose interests should, after all, be at 
the heart of the remedial calculus. Thus, the question surely must be what 
happens if the legislature does change the law. Can the original claimant 
benefit from such a change of law? Most constitutionalists talking 
dialogue, seem to be little interested in that question.98 It is highly 
relevant, however, because legislatures have a tendency of solving the 
matter prospectively only. This leaves it up to the courts to devise a 
remedial structure which ensures that litigants are not forgotten in this 
political game between the institutions. There is still much work to be 
done in that respect. However, the approach taken by the German 
Constitutional Court may provide us with some clues in this respect. It 
provides the legislature with relatively clear guidance as to what is 
required in terms of retrospectivity. Moreover, as we have seen, the court 
has specifically outlined the duties of regular courts and executive 
agencies with respect to the effects of its declaration of unconstitutionality 
for ongoing cases, thus ensuring that litigants are not forgotten. 
Developing such a framework is difficult to be sure, but necessary 
nonetheless. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In the world of constitutional remedies, the problem of 
underinclusiveness may be described as the ultimate litmus test. It puts 
courts before complex and interconnected constitutional issues. The 
United States Supreme Court has tried to close Pandora’s box by invoking 
legislative intent. Comparative analysis shows, however, that legislative 
intent is neither a necessary nor even a convenient basis for remedial 
policy. A more flexible approach that builds upon proportionality and 
dialogue would enable courts to reconcile the fundamental right to a 
remedy with collective self-determination. Our efforts should be directed 
towards refining such an approach. That is the challenge for the years to 
come. 
97. See, e.g., Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in
Constitutional Remedies, 33 ARIZONA L. REV. 559 (1991) (stressing the need to address constitutional 
defects on a more structural level). 
98. But see Choudhry & Roach, supra note 55; Aruna Sathanapally, BEYOND DISAGREEMENT: 
OPEN REMEDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION (Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 2012). 
